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I. Introduction'
In many countries, governments have permitted the application
of religious laws and have delegated judicial authority to religious
2courts. These practices may violate women's human rights for at
least four reasons. First, women are barred from leadership positions
within many religious institutions, and are therefore prevented from
helping interpret the religious precepts and develop the law that is
being applied by the religious courts. This exclusion of women
violates their right to participate in governance, democracy, and
decision-making, which are essential components of law-making.
Second, women are excluded from serving as judges on religious
courts, thereby calling into question the impartiality (both actual and
perceived) of these tribunals. Third, the law applied by religious
courts is frequently discriminatory against women, e.g., in the area of
family law. This violates women's right to equal protection of the
law and to nondiscrimination. Fourth, considering the fact that the law
applied by religious courts is based upon a particular religious
interpretation held by the judges, this may be a violation of the right
to the religious freedom of the parties appearing before the courts
when the religious beliefs of the parties differ from those of the
judges.
To place this discussion within a broader historical context, it is
1. Quotations throughout this paper have omitted internal footnotes unless they are
relevant to the discussion.
2. This paper does not draw a distinction between religious courts that are sanctioned
by secular states and those that are sanctioned by theocratic states, as the problems raised by
religious courts under both systems are the same. For a general discussion, see JANE H. BAYES
& NAYEREH TOHIDI, GLOBALIZATION, GENDER, AND RELIGION: THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S
RIGHTS IN CATHOLIC AND MUSLIM CONTEXTS 51 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2001) [hereinafter
Globalization, Gender, and Religion] ("Our observations indicate that religious theocratic
states are not able to empower women nor are they able to provide an inclusive democracy
for their citizens. Religion is important but should be separated from state power.").
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important to note that religious dogma has been used throughout the
world for centuries as a rationale for applying discriminatory laws -
both secular and sectarian - against women. In the United States in
1873, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court in Bradwell v. Illinios,
upheld the denial of petitioner's application to be admitted as a
lawyer to the Illinois bar. The Illinois Supreme Court had reasoned:
[T]hat God designed the sexes to occupy different spheres
of action, and that it belonged to men to make, apply, and
execute the laws, was regarded as an almost axiomatic
truth. In view of these facts, we are certainly warranted in
saying that when the legislature gave to this court the
power of granting licenses to practice law, it was with not
the slightest expectation that this privilege would be
extended to women."3
A concurring opinion by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Joseph P.
Bradley stated:
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always
recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres
and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be,
woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil
life. The constitution of the family organization, which is
founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature
of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which
properly belongs to the domain and functions of
womanhood. The harmony, not to say identity, of interest
and views which belong, or should belong, to the family
institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting
a distinct and independent career from that of her
husband. So firmly fixed was this sentiment in the
founders of the common law that it became a maxim of
that system of jurisprudence that a woman had no legal
3. Supreme Court Decisions and Women's Rights: Milestones to Equality, THE
SUPREME COuRT HISTORICAL SOCIETY (Clare Cushman, ed., 2001) (citing Bradwell v.
Illinios, 83 U.S. 130 (1873)).
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existence separate from her husband, who was regarded
as her head and representative in the social state; and,
notwithstanding some recent modifications of this civil
status, many of the special rules of law flowing from and
dependent upon this cardinal principle still exist in full
force in most States. One of these is that a married
woman is incapable, without her husband's consent, of
making contracts which shall be binding on her or him.
This very incapacity was one circumstance which the
Supreme Court of Illinois deemed important in rendering
a married woman incompetent fully to perform the duties
and trusts that belong to the office of an attorney and
counselor.
It is true that many women are unmarried and not
affected by any of the duties, complications, and
incapacities arising out of the married state, but these
are exceptions to the general rule. The paramount
destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble
and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law
of the Creator. And the rules of civil society must be
adapted to the general constitution of things, and
cannot be based upon exceptional cases.'
Although these cases were applying secular law, the justices
used religious interpretations and justifications for applying the law
in a manner that would discriminate against women.
This paper focuses specifically upon religious law as it is
currently applied and religious courts as they currently operate in the
world today. In Israel, for example, both marriage and divorce are
governed by religious law (Jewish law for Jews, Islamic law for
Muslims, and Christian law for Christians), which is administered by
religious courts. The application of this system may result in
discrimination against women, such as, the inequality of divorce law
in the Jewish courts (where women must obtain permission from
their husbands for divorce (the get), but men may receive approval to
divorce from the rabbinical court without obtaining their wives'
4. Id.
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permission). Moreover, only men may serve as adjudicators on the
rabbinical courts.6 As another example, in the United Kingdom,
Jewish courts have gained recognition by the government to
adjudicate family law matters, such as divorce. A public debate is
taking place about granting the same recognition to Muslim courts,
with women's rights advocates raising concern about discrimination
against women by the religious courts.7
To further sharpen the focus, this paper hones in on the African
human rights system and how it might address the tensions between
religious law and courts and women's human rights. By way of
example,
"Kenya has four systems of family law: statutory law
based on the Christian-influenced legal system imposed
under colonial rule, Hindu, Islamic and African
customary family law... Polygamy is widely practiced,
where men (but not women) are allowed to marry more
than one spouse. Husbands may bring lawsuits against
wives for adultery, but not vice versa. Customary and
Islamic divorce is extrajudicial, leaving women without
an independent hearing and largely without access to
marital property or maintenance (let alone equal division
of property)."
5. WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 89, 92 -
93 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper, eds., 1995) [hereinafter Women's Rights, Human Rights]
("[I]f a wife refuses to grant her husband a divorce or is incompetent to do so, the husband
might be given special permission [by the rabbinical court] to marry another woman. On the
other hand, if it is the husband who refuses the divorce, the woman remains bound in
marriage ... Hence the grave predicament of the agunah (the woman who is unable to get a
divorce because her husband arbitrarily refuses to grant it, or has abandoned her and
disappeared, or is simply incompetent.).")
6. Id. ("According to halakha [Jewish law], women are disqualified from becoming
rabbis. And since only rabbis may officiate at marriages and sit as judges on the rabbinical
courts in cases of divorce, women subsequently are incompetent, under Israeli law, to fill
such public functions.").
7. Innes Bowen, The End of One Law for All?, BBC NEWS (Nov. 28, 2006) available
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk-news/magazine/6190080.stm.
8. Women's Rights, Human Rights, supra note 4, at 79 (Women in Kenya are often
forced by their fathers to marry without the women's consent. Girls are frequently married
off to older men. Husbands' payment of dowry to the brides' fathers lead husbands to regard
their wives as property). See also id. at 144 n.5 ("[T]he Civil Code of Ethiopia recognizes
three types of marriages: (1) civil marriage, which is celebrated before an officer of civil
status; (2) religious marriage, which is celebrated according to the religious rite of the
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This paper questions whether such religious law may violate
women's human rights as recognized by both African and
universal human rights instruments.
International and regional human rights entities appear to be
reluctant to confront the human rights issues that are raised by the
institution of religious law and courts and their discriminatory effects
upon women. Although several harsh punishments under religious
laws that discriminate against women have been recognized as
human rights violations,9 the international human rights community
has not yet made it clear that governments allowing the application
of religious laws and delegating judicial authority to religious courts
may, in and of themselves, violate women's human rights.10 See, for
example, the rather tepid regional and international reaction to the
fact that Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia have entered reservations based
on Islam to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Egypt indicated that it
religion of one or both of the parties; (3) customary marriage, which is celebrated according
to the custom of the community to which the spouses belong.").
9. In a Nigerian case in 2002, Amina Lawal, who had been divorced and subsequently
gave birth to a child, was convicted of adultery and sentenced to be stoned to death under
Shari'a law. See Dan Isaacs, Nigerian Woman Fights Stoning, BBC NEWS (July 8, 2008)
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilafrica/2116540 ("An Islamic court in northern
Nigeria has begun hearing an appeal from a woman convicted of adultery and sentenced to
death by stoning under controversial Sharia, or Islamic, law ... Despite the Nigerian federal
government declaring such strict Sharia punishments unconstitutional, the country's northern
states appear determined to enforce these laws .... Human rights campaigners say that the
punishment is not only inhumane but severely discriminates against women .... To convict a
man of the same crime he must either confess directly to the court, or no less than four men
have to attest to witnessing the physical act of adultery ... The federal government has
declared such Sharia punishments unconstitutional but, in direct defiance of this, northern
leaders have pressed ahead, resisting what they describe as "undue pressure" from non-
Muslims in the Nigerian Government .... If Amina Lawal loses her appeal this time, she can
take her case all the way to the Supreme Court in Abuja .... Only then would the debate
come to a head and the constitutionality of the strict Sharia punishments really be tested.")
(italics added). According to this account, only the Shari'a punishments are considered
problematic).
10. See, e.g., Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, State Responsibility under International
Human Rights Law to Change Religious and Customary Laws, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF
WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 168, 172-3 and 176 (Rebecca J.
Cook, ed. 1994) (An-Na'im makes a brilliant argument for changing religious law in order
to comply with international human rights norms regarding women, but does not question
the validity of the religious legal institutions themselves and their possible non-compliance
with international human rights norms).
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would comply with CEDAW's antidiscrimination provisions
"provided that such compliance does not run counter to the Islamic
[Sihari'a."11
Africa has about 310.5 million Muslims and 118 million
Catholics,1 2 63 million adherents of traditional African religions,13
two million Hindus population,14 and 77,700 Jews (with the vast
majority living in South Africa).'5 Millions of Africans follow more
than one religion (e.g., engaging in traditional religious practices
alongside Islam or Christianity).16 Considering these numbers and the
fact that religious courts may affect the rights of millions of people
within Africa, it is incumbent upon the African human rights system
to address these issues.
This paper seeks to initiate a conversation about these issues;
suggesting that governmental recognition of religious law and
delegation of jurisdiction to religious courts may indeed violate
women's human rights. 7 Part II of the paper examines the protection
of women's human rights within the major African and universal
human rights instruments. Part III provides examples of concerns
regarding the abdication of governmental authority over lawmaking
and adjudicating to religious leaders and to religious courts and how
this action violates women's human rights. Part IV suggests that the
African human rights system - including judges, legislators, civil
society actors, and others at the local and national evels, as well as
11. Women's Rights, Human Rights, supra note 4, at 178.
12. Globalization, Gender, and Religion, supra note 2, at 19.
13. John S. Mbiti, INTRODUCTION To AFRICAN RELIGION 33 (Heinemann Educational
Books, 2 ed. 1991), in ADHERENTS.COM, http://www.adherents.com/Na/Na8.html#42 (last
visited, Dec. 14, 2008).
14. Id.
15. The Jewish Population of the World, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY, A DIVISION OF THE
AMERICAN-ISRAELI COOPERATIVE ENTERPRISE, (Dec. 14, 2008), http://www.jewishvirtualli
brary.org/jsource/Judaism/jewpop.html.
16. Mbiti, supra note 13, at 34.
17. This paper focuses on rights, and does not attempt to address the issue of duties
under human rights instruments. It is the author's viewpoint that States must safeguard the
rights of individuals regardless of whether or not the individuals have fulfilled the "duties"
delineated in human rights instruments; therefore, a discussion of duties is not relevant to
this paper. By like token, States are unlikely to acquiesce with the proposition that
individuals are absolved of their duties under human rights instruments in the event that the
States violate their obligations, since no State has completely protected all human rights
within any instrument (hence all are in violation). Therefore, the fulfillment of duties is not
a prerequisite to the protection of rights; indeed, they are independent of each other.
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at the regional and international levels - should open a wider
dialogue regarding the role of religious law and courts concerning
women's human rights and solutions to possible violations that may
arise. The paper concludes by acknowledging that these are difficult
and complex issues that may take substantial time and effort to
resolve, and that first steps should entail education and dialogue.
II. Protection of Women's Rights within
Human Rights Instruments
This section of the paper examines the protection of women's
human rights within major African and universal human rights
instruments, particularly in the context of religious law and religious
courts.18 It examines the rights protected by the African Charter of
Human and People's Rights (African Charter);19 the Protocol to the
African Charter on the Rights of Women (Women's Rights
Protocol);20 the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU
Constitutive Act);21 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW); 22 the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR);23 the International Covenant
18. This paper focuses on the rights of adults, and does not attempt to address the
complexities surrounding religious rights intertwined with the rights and duties of parents
and children (although this would be an interesting topic for a future paper). Therefore, this
section does not include a discussion of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of
the Child nor the international Convention on the Rights of the Child.
19. African Charter on Human and People's Rights, also known as the Banjul Charter,
adopted June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217. The charter has been ratified by all Member
States of the African Union except South Sudan. Ratification Table: African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights, ACHPR, http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/ratification/
(last visited Nov. 16, 2015) [hereinafter African Charter].
20. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of
Women in Africa, July 11, 2003, CAB/LEG/66.6 (entered into force Nov. 25, 2005);
http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/women-protocol/achpr-instr.proto-women-eng.pdf
[hereinafter Women's Rights Protocol].
21. Constitutive Act of the African Union CAB/LEG/23.15 (May 26, 2001)
[hereinafter Constitutive Act].
22. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180,
(entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW].
23. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217(111), UN GAOR, 3d Sess.,
Supp. No. 13, UN Doc. A/810 (1948) 71 [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
8 [Vol. 39:1
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on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR);24 and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).2 5
This section will address four categories of women's human rights
issues, corresponding with the four possible violations that were
raised in the previous section.26 First, women have an equal right to
participate in governance, democracy, and decision-making. Second,
women have a right to appear before judicial tribunals that are indeed
impartial, both in fact and in perception, and therefore women must
be eligible to serve as judges on those tribunals. Third, women have
a right to equal protection of the law and to nondiscrimination under
the law. Fourth, women have a right to freedom of religion or belief.
Each of these issues will be considered in turn.
It should first be noted that the African Commission on Human
and Peoples' Rights (Commission) and African Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights (Court) should interpret the African and international
human rights instruments "in accordance with the fundamental
obligation to respect and observe human rights for all," 27 so as to
provide the broadest possible protection of human rights. The
24. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, (entered into
force March 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
25. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3,
(entered into force January 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].
26. Of course, secular law and courts may also pose similar problems, which should be
addressed in like measure wherever they arise, but in the world as it is today the religious
laws and courts appear to pose more concern regarding women's human rights. See Mahnaz
Afkhami, Gender Apartheid, Cultural Relativism, and Women's Human Rights in Muslim
Societies, in WOMEN, GENDER, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, 214 (Marjorie
Agosin, ed. 2001) [hereinafter Women, Gender, and Human Rights] ("Clearly, this is not
simply a question of law - religious or secular. Secular law may be as repressive as religious
law. Rather, it has to do with the historical development of a kind of individual
consciousness that defines the meaning of right. History moves from law to right - that is,
from norms that have been given before the fact to norms that are established by
participation and by dialogue among free individuals. Rights, therefore, cannot be severed
from freedom. Considered in this light, right is not only a property of the relationship
between government and the individual. It is, above all, a matter of individual space within
the social system. It is the ability of a woman to speak, to move, to work, and to choose
freely. Millions of Muslim women in Muslim societies demand but are denied this leeway by
their governments or by the more powerful members of their male-dominated societies.").
27. Fitnat Adjetey, Reclaiming the African Woman's Individuality: The Struggle
between Women's Reproductive Autonomy and African Society and Culture, 44 AM. U. L.
REV. 1376 (1995).
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Charter mandates that the Court and Commission interpret the
document in conjunction with other human rights instruments, all of
which contain strong provisions guaranteeing nondiscrimination and
equality for women; and each of these provisions are necessarily read
in conjunction with the other provisions highlighted in each of the
subsections within this section of the paper.2 8
Moreover, if a state has made reservations limiting their
obligations under certain provisions, but not to others that relate to
the same issue (or not to similar provisions in other documents it has
ratified), then the provisions to which the state did not submit a
reservation must still apply (since the state did not object to those
provisions). The object and purpose of each of the human rights
instruments is to protect human rights. Where ambiguities exist, the
provisions providing the greatest protection to the individual are the
ones that must be applied, and the interpretations providing the
greatest protection to the individual are the interpretations that
should be followed.29 Furthermore, under the Velasquez-Rodriguez
decision by the Inter-American Human Rights Court, which has been
recognized by the African Commission on Human and People's
Rights,30 the state is also obligated to ensure that private actors -
28. See, e.g., AU Constitutive Act, supra note 21, art. 3(e); African Charter, supra note
19, art. 2, art. 3, art. 18(3); Women's Rights Protocol, supra note 20, art. 1(f), art. 2, art. 8;
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 23, art. 2, art. 7; International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 24, art. 2, art. 3, art. 26; International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 25, art. 2, art. 3.
29. See, e.g., CEDAW, supra note 22, art. 23 ("Nothing in the present Convention shall
affect any provisions that are more conducive to the achievement of equality between men
and women which may be contained: (a) In the legislation of a State Party; or (b) In any
other international convention, treaty or agreement in force for that State.").
30. See Afr. Commission on Human and People's Rights No. 155/96, Social and
Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria
(Oct. 27, 2011) ("57. Governments have a duty to protect their citizens, not only through
appropriate legislation and effective enforcement but also by protecting them from
damaging acts that may be perpetrated by private parties (See Union des Jeunes Avocats
/Chad). This duty calls for positive action on part of governments in fulfilling their
obligation under human rights instruments. The practice before other tribunals also enhances
this requirement as is evidenced in the case Veldsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras. In this
landmark judgment, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights held that when a State
allows private persons or groups to act freely and with impunity to the detriment of the
rights recognized, it would be in clear violation of its obligations to protect the human rights
of its citizens. Similarly, this obligation of the State is further emphasized in the practice of
the European Court of Human Rights, in X and Y v. Netherlands. In that case, the Court
pronounced that there was an obligation on authorities to take steps to make sure that the
10 [Vol. 39:1
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such as the religious entities to which the state has delegated
lawmaking or judicial authority - also respect human rights.31
A. Right to Participate in Governance, Democracy,
and Decision-Making
Women have an equal right to participate in governance,
democracy, and decision-making, which are essential components of
lawmaking. Under the African Charter, Article 13, "Every citizen
shall have the right to participate freely in the government of [her]
country, either directly or through freely chosen representatives in
accordance with the provisions of law." 32 Obviously, one of the
primary functions of government is lawmaking. This provision must
be read in conjunction with Article 18, section 3, which declares that
"The state shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination against
women and also ensure the protection of the rights of the woman ...
as stipulated in international declarations and conventions."33
Furthermore, the Women's Rights Protocol, Article 9 recognizes the
right of women to participate in the political and decision-making
process, including "the equal participation of women in the political
life of their countries," and provides that "States Parties shall ensure
increased and effective representation and participation of women at
all levels of decision-making."34 Additionally, CEDAW provides in
enjoyment of the rights is not interfered with by any other private person.").
31. Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment, Inter-Am.Ct.H.R. (ser. C) No. 4. 167 (July
29, 1988). (Judgment ) ("The obligation to ensure the free and full exercise of human rights
is not fulfilled by the existence of a legal system designed to make it possible to comply
with this obligation - it also requires the government to conduct itself so as to effectively
ensure the free and full exercise of human rights ... 172. Thus, in principle, any violation of
rights recognized by the Convention carried out by an act of public authority or by persons
who use their position of authority is imputable to the State. However, this does not define
all the circumstances in which a State is obligated to prevent, investigate and punish human
rights violations, nor all the cases in which the State might be found responsible for an
infringement of those rights. An illegal act which violates human rights and which is
initially not directly imputable to a State (for example, because it is the act of a private
person or because the person responsible has not been identified ) can lead to international
responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due
diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by the Convention.").
32. African Charter, supra note 19, art. 13; See also, Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, supra note 23, art. 21; ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 25.
33. African Charter, supra note 19, art. 18.
34. Women's Rights Protocol, supra note 20, art. 9.
2016] 11I
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Article 7 that "States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to
eliminate discrimination against women in the political and public life
of the country and, in particular, shall ensure to women, on equal
terms with men, the right . . . To participate in the formulation of
government policy and the implementation thereof and to hold public
office and perform all public functions at all levels of government;
[and] To participate in nongovernmental organizations and
associations concerned with the public and political life of the
country."35 Therefore, women arguably have a right equally with men
to directly participate in lawmaking and to choose representatives who
will participate in lawmaking, including female representatives.
Moreover, in reading these provisions together, government
representatives ("the state") may only delegate lawmaking authority to
entities that are likewise nondiscriminatory which will ensure the
elimination of every form of discrimination against women.
Furthermore, under the doctrine of state responsibility for private
actors, states must ensure that any lawmaking functions are delegated
only to entities that ensure women's equality, even where those
entities may operate independently from the state. Additionally, the
African Charter, Article 13 provides that "Every citizen shall have the
right of equal access to the public service of [her] country,"3 6
indicating that women should be able to hold any position that has
governmental decision-making powers (such as lawmaking) in her
country.
This interpretation is bolstered by the African Charter, Article
17, section 3 which provides that "promotion and protection of the
morals and traditional values recognized by the community shall be
the duty of the State."3 7 Read in conjunction with the non-
discrimination provision in Article 18, section 3, women must be
included within the "community" that is determining which morals
and values are to be protected and promoted through laws applied
within their country.3 8 Furthermore, the preamble to the Women's
Rights Protocol recognizes "the crucial role of women in the
35. CEDAW, supra note 22, art. 7.
36. African charter, supra note 19, art 13.
37. African Charter, supra note 19, art. 13 (emphasis added).
38. African charter, supra note 19, art 18.
12 [Vol. 39:1
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preservation of African values based on the principles of equality,
peace, freedom, dignity, justice, solidarity and democracy,"39 again
highlighting that women should play an equal role in democracy and
lawmaking and that African cultural values reaffirm this right.
Support for women's right to participate equally in lawmaking is also
strengthened by the principles highlighted within AU Constitutive
Act, Article 4, including "promotion of gender equality [and ... ]
respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and
good governance."40 When women are banned from leadership
positions within religious institutions, and are therefore prevented
from participating in the interpretation of religious precepts and
development of the law that is being applied by the religious courts,
this violates their rights to participate in governance, democracy,
decision-making, and lawmaking.
B. Right to Trial by a Fair, Impartial, and Independent Tribunal
Women have a right to impartial judicial tribunals, both actual
and perceived. Article 7 of the African Charter provides that "Every
individual shall have the right to have [her] cause heard ... by an
impartial court or tribunal."4 1 Article 13 guarantees that "Every
individual shall have the right of access to public ... services in
strict equality of all persons before the law."4 2 The Women's Rights
Protocol, Article 8, section (e) requires that States Parties must take
all appropriate measures to ensure that "women are represented
equally in the judiciary and law enforcement organs."43 The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 8 notes that
"Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted
him by the constitution or by law."" Moreover, UDHR Article 10
highlights that "Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and
public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the
39. Women's Rights Protocol, supra note 20, preamble.
40. Constitutive Act, supra note 21, art. 4.
41. African Charter, supra note 19, art. 7.
42. African Charter, supra note 19, art. 13.
43. Women's Rights Protocol, supra note 20, art. 8.
44. UDHR, supra note 23, art. 8.
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determination of [her] rights and obligations and of any criminal
charge against [her]."45 The Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Article 2, section c-e
mandates that States will undertake "to ensure through competent
national tribunals and other public institutions the effective
protection of women against any act of discrimination, to refrain
from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against
women and to ensure that public authorities and institutions shall act
in conformity with this obligation, and to take all appropriate
measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person,
organization or enterprise."46 The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Article 2, section 3, subsection a-b provides that
all States Parties undertake "To ensure that any person whose rights
or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective
remedy [and] To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy
shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial,
administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent
authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to
develop the possibilities of judicial remedy."47 When read in light of
the general equality and nondiscrimination provisions noted above,
these provisions clearly affirm that women have both the right to
serve in the judiciary on an equal basis with men and the right to
access a judiciary that is nondiscriminatory (i.e., which permits
women as well as men to serve as judges).
As another point of note regarding the importance of impartial
tribunals, Article 26 of the African Charter indicates that "States
parties to the present Charter shall have the duty to guarantee the
independence of the Courts."48 Therefore, tribunals must exercise
care to maintain their independence and not be subject to persons
who are not serving on the court (e.g., religious leaders like the Pope
or Ayatollah). In sum, the right of a woman to a trial by an impartial
tribunal is imperiled, both when women are banned from serving as
judges on tribunals and when courts are subject to the authority of
religious leaders, thereby calling into question the impartiality (both
45. Id., art. 10.
46. CEDAW, supra note 22, art. 2.
47. ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 2.
48. African Charter, supra note 19, art. 26.
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actual and perceived) of these tribunals.
C. Right to Equality and NonDiscrimination
Women have a right to equal protection of the law and to
nondiscrimination under the law. African Charter, Article 3 indicates
"Every individual shall be equal before the law [and] Every
individual shall be entitled to equal protection of the law."49 UDHR,
Article 7 provides "All are equal before the law and are entitled
without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are
entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of
this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination."'0
ICCPR, Article 3 indicates that "The States Parties to the present
Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to
the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present
Covenant."' Article 26 provides "All persons are equal before the law
and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of
the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and
guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against
discrimination on any ground such as sex. . ."52
And of course, the Women's Rights Protocol and CEDAW each
contain very specific provisions guaranteeing equality and
nondiscrimination under the laws of the country. The Women's Rights
Protocol, Article 2 warrants particular mention for the breadth and
depth of protection guaranteeing women's right to equality and
nondiscrimination:
1. States Parties shall combat all forms of discrimination against
women through appropriate legislative, institutional and other
measures. In this regard they shall:
(a) include in their national constitutions and other
legislative instruments, if not already done, the principle
of equality between women and men and ensure its
49. African Charter, supra note 19, art. 3.
50. UDHR, supra note 23, art. 7.
51. ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 3.
52. Id., art 26.
152016]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
effective application;
(b) enact and effectively implement appropriate legislative or
regulatory measures, including those prohibiting and
curbing all forms of discrimination ...
(d) take corrective and positive action in those areas where
discrimination against women in law and in fact
continues to exist;
(e) support the local, national, regional and continental
initiatives directed at eradicating all forms of
discrimination against women.
2. States Parties shall commit themselves to modify the social
and cultural patterns of conduct of women and men through
public education, information, education and communication
strategies, with a view to achieving the elimination of
harmful cultural and traditional practices and all other
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the
superiority of either of the sexes, or on stereotyped roles for
women and men."
Although CEDAW, Article 2 does not appear to be quite as strong as
the Women's Rights Protocol, it also bears special mention since
nearly every country in Africa has ratified this treaty:
States condemn discrimination against women in all its forms,
agree to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a
policy of eliminating discrimination against women and, to this
end, undertake:
(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and
women in their national constitutions or other
appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated therein
and to ensure, through law and other appropriate means,
the practical realization of this principle;
(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures,
including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all
discrimination against women; ...
53. Women's Rights Protocol, supra note 20, art. 2.
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(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation,
to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs
and practices which constitute discrimination against
women;
(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute
discrimination against women.54
Significantly for purposes of considering religious law and religious
courts, both the Women's Rights Protocol and CEDAW guarantee
women equality before the law:
Women's Rights Protocol Art. 8. Access to Justice and Equal
Protection before the Law
Women and men are equal before the law and shall have the
right to equal protection and benefit of the law. States Parties
shall take all appropriate measures to ensure:
(f) reform of existing discriminatory laws and practices in
order to promote and protect the rights of women.5 5
CEDAW, Art. 15
1. States Parties shall accord to women equality with men before
the law.
2. States Parties shall accord to women, in civil matters, a legal
capacity identical to that of men and the same opportunities to
exercise that capacity. . . [T]hey shall give women equal rights
to conclude contracts and to administer property and shall treat
them equally in all stages of procedure in courts and tribunals.
3. States Parties agree that all contracts and all other private
instruments of any kind with a legal effect which is directed at
restricting the legal capacity of women shall be deemed null
and void.56
Furthermore, these treaties contain specific provisions guaranteeing
54. CEDAW, supra note 22, art. 2.
55. Women's Rights Protocol, supra note 20, art. 8.
56. CEDAW, supra note 22, art. 15.
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women's equality with men in the context of particular issues, such as
marriage 5 7 and culture." When the ecclesiastical law that is being
applied by religious courts is, in fact, discriminatory against women,
this violates the right to equal protection of the law and to
nondiscrimination.
D. Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief
Some, but not all, of the major human rights instruments provide
for a right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion and a right
to nondiscrimination based on religion.59 Article 2 of the UDHR
reaffirms the principle of nondiscrimination on the grounds of sex,
religion, or any other opinion.60 UDHR, Article 18 has one of the
strongest provisions protecting freedom of religion or belief,
guaranteeing that "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change [her]
religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with
others and in public or private, to manifest [her] religion or belief in
teaching, practice, worship and observance."61 This mandate is
bolstered by UDHR Article 19, guaranteeing that "Everyone has the
right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom
to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of
frontiers."6 2 Presumably, these opinions and expressions may be about
religious, atheist, or agnostic beliefs as well as other secular topics.
Moreover, UDHR, Article 16 guarantees individuals the right to marry
57. Women's Rights Protocol, supra note 20, art. 6 & 7; (note, since the Protocol is a
pragmatic compromise document, art. 9 allows discrimination regarding marriage, but only
in limited and specifically defined circumstances, such as polygamy and the nationality of
children where national legislation permits uch discrimination or where discrimination is
justified on national security grounds); CEDAW, supra note 22, art. 13 & 16.
58. CEDAW, supra note 22, art. 5. ("States Parties shall take all appropriate measures:
a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to
achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are
based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped
roles for men and women.").
59. See, e.g., African Charter, supra note 19, preamble & art. 2; Women's Rights
Protocol, supra note 20, preamble.
60. UDHR, supra note 23, art. 2.
61. Id., art. 18.
62. Id., art. 19.
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a person who is not of their religious faith and guarantees equality for
women and men at the initiation, during, and at the dissolution of
marriage.6 3
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also
provides certain guarantees regarding religion. Article 2 indicates that
States undertake "to respect and to ensure to all individuals ... the
rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any
kind, such as .. . sex, . . . religion, political or other opinion. . ."64
ICCPR, Article 18 echoes and strengthens UDHR's Article 18, by
affimning that:
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to
have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom,
either individually or in community with others and in public
or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship,
observance, practice and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his
freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are
necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or
the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.65
Interestingly, Article 23, section 4 of ICCPR, which provides for
equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses, does not make any
mention of religion, in contrast to UDHR Article 16.66 Yet ICCPR
adds a new provision concerning religion in Article 27, providing
that "In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities
exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the
right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy
their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use
their own language."67
63. Id., art. 16.
64. ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 2.
65. Id., art. 18.
66. Id., art. 23.
67. Id., art. 27.
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By contrast, Article 8 of the African Charter contains a more
limited guarantee, providing that "Freedom of conscience, the
profession and free practice of religion shall be guaranteed. No one
may, subject to law and order, be submitted to measures restricting
the exercise of these freedoms."" The only provision regarding
religion in the Women's Rights Protocol is found in the Preamble,
which simply reaffirms the principle of nondiscrimination on the
grounds of sex, religion, or any other opinion.69 The Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, on
the other hand, makes no mention of religion at all.70
Religion is frequently deemed to be part of the culture of a
community. Considered in this light, there are numerous provisions
requiring the elimination of cultural practices that adversely impact
women. For example, under CEDAW, Article 5, "States Parties shall
take all appropriate measures: (a) To modify the social and cultural
patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the
elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices
which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of
either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women."7 1
Moreover, CEDAW, Article 13 provides that "States Parties shall
take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against
women in other areas of economic and social life in order to ensure,
on a basis of equality of men and women, the same rights, in
particular: (c) The right to participate in... all aspects of cultural
life."7 2 Article 29 of the African Charter provides that "The individual
shall also have the duty ... to preserve and strengthen positive African
cultural values . . ."73 acknowledging the distinction between positive
and negative cultural values. Since religion may be considered to be
an aspect of the culture, morals, and values of a country, it suggests
that only the positive African cultural values are to be preserved and
strengthened. When considering the emphasis that is placed on
women's equality and nondiscrimination against women by the
68. African Charter, supra note 19, art. 8.
69. Women's Rights Protocol, supra note 20, preamble.
70. CEDAW, supra note 22.
71. Id., art. 5.
72. Id., art. 13.
73. African Charter, supra note 19, art. 29 (emphasis added).
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African Charter, and other African and international human rights
instruments, it can be fairly argued that they are part of the positive
African cultural values that are to be prioritized as against other less-
positive cultural values that may discriminate against women.
As with the other rights discussed previously, when considering
the provisions regarding religion in light of the provisions in all
documents that guarantee women's right to equality and to non-
discrimination based on gender - it is clear that women as well as
men possess the right to freedom of religion or belief that are
guaranteed by the provisions outlined in this section. Because the
law applied by religious courts is based upon a particular
interpretation of religion held by the judges (or by the religious
leadership to whom they may be subservient), this may violate the
right to religious freedom held by the parties appearing before the
courts (e.g., if religious beliefs and interpretations of the parties
differ from those of the judges).
III. Application of Religious Law May Violate
Women's Human Rights
This section discusses ways in which religious law and religious
courts may violate women's human rights, with a particular focus on
Africa. It demonstrates that although human rights advocates may
recognize the decisions and penalties imposed by religious courts as
discriminatory against women, they have not generally questioned the
very existence and functioning of religious law and religious courts -
at least as they are typically structured today7 4 - as potentially
violating women's human rights. This section follows the format of
the prior sections in addressing four potential violations of women's
human rights by religious laws and courts: 1) inhibiting women from
74. This is not to say that religious law and religious courts would always inherently be
in violation of women's human rights. For example, perhaps they would pass muster if 1)
the process of lawmaking and adjudicating were fully democratic (e.g., women have equal
opportunities to become decision-makers, adjudicators, etc.), 2) if the religious laws
provided full equality for women, were protective of individual choice, and were not based
on gendered stereotypes, 3) if there existed a parallel system for people of different religions
who live in that country, as well as a civil system which anyone of any religious affiliation
(or nonaffiliation) could choose as an alternative to the religious laws and courts, and 4) if
certain practices that are inherently antithetical to human rights were prohibited entirely
(e.g., child marriage, polygamy, FGM, etc.).
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leadership positions in religious institutions shaping religious law; 2)
banning women from serving as judges on religious tribunals; 3)
applying gender-discriminatory religious law against women; and 4)
imposing religious tenets upon individuals who hold different
religious beliefs.
A. Inhibiting Women from Religious Leadership and Shaping
Religious Laws
Women's human rights are violated by application of religious
laws and courts due to the discrimination against women in all major
world religions historically prohibiting them from becoming
religious leaders.75 Few women have played a central role in the
development and interpretation of religious law. Women are largely
proscribed, or are altogether prohibited, from participating in
leadership positions within many of the religions that are practiced in
Africa.7 6 Such discrimination has largely inhibited women from
participating in the interpretation and evolution of religious tenets,
practices, and principles of these religions.
No religion is static. All religions change over time, and at any
moment in time religions include followers having many different
interpretations of that religion.7 7 Both Christianity and Islam have
75. Globalization, Gender, and Religion, supra note 2, at 19 ("Both the Roman Catholic
and the Muslim religions are often associated with autocratic governments having laws,
special male officers, and bureaucratic organizations. Neither Roman Catholic nor Islamic
authorities will allow women to hold higher positions of religious authority. Both exercise
executive, legislative and judicial functions. Both cross the boundaries of nation-states . . .").
76. Of course, this fact applies globally as well. See, e.g., Bart D. Ehrman, MISQUOTING
JESUS: THE STORY BEHIND WHO CHANGED THE BIBLE AND WHY, (Harper Collins Publishers
2005) (discussing the deliberate exclusion of women from leadership positions within
Christianity); Elizabeth A. Johnson, SHE WHO IS: THE MYSTERY OF GOD IN FEMINIST
THEOLOGICAL DISCOURSE (Crossroads Publishing Co. 1st ed. 1992) (discussing the
exclusion of women from leadership positions in the Catholic Church and theology); and
Irshad Manji, THE TROUBLE WITH ISLAM TODAY: A MUSLIM'S CALL FOR REFORM IN HER
FAITH (St. Martin's Griffin Press 2005) (discussing the exclusion of women from leadership
positions in Islam).
77. Globalization, Gender, and Religion, supra note 2, at 19 ("Both the Roman Catholic
and the Muslim religions ... cross the boundaries of nation-states, yet the histories, the
customs, and the cultures of specific localities shape the practice of each religion. Neither
religion is monolithic or unified . . Each contains within it many schisms, disagreements,
and conflicts."). See also Women's Rights, Human Rights, supra note 11, at 180-181
("Western supporters of cultural relativist approaches seem disposed to believe that non-
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written scriptures (the Bible and the Quran) containing contradictory
injunctions and statements regarding women. Although the Bible is
said to be divinely inspired, its text has been scribed, copied, and
changed countless times over the centuries - nearly all of which was
done by men (monks, educated elite, etc.). 8 Men in power have
historically defined religion to their benefit and to bolster their
power, and have imposed that interpretation on those who have less
power within that community, i.e., women.79 Scholars in recent
decades have noted that "some of these general assumptions are being
challenged by modern feminist theorists."0 Although women are
western cultures are monolithic and immutable. In reality, intense conflicts and debates on
rights issues rage within Muslim countries from Africa to Asia, particularly regarding the
rights of women; there is no single monolithic cultural position on women's role in society
and no unanimity of opinion about how Islamic requirements should apply to problems of
contemporary societies. A substantial feminist literature has been produced by Muslim
women in the Middle East that seriously challenges the patriarchal biases that infect the
political systems in the region as well as the readings offered by male interpreters of the
Islamic sources. It is inconvenient for [Islamic] regimes attempting to legitimize their
opposition to women's rights by appeals to Islam to be faced with domestic manifestations
of feminist dissent, and there have been many instances in which regimes have tried to
stamp out Muslim women's voices."). See also, Women's Rights, Human Rights, supra
note 5, at 181 (for example, Egypt's suppression of the Arab Women's Solidarity
Association (AWSA) in 1991, and the court's decision upholding the suppression because
AWSA had "threatened the peace and political and social order of the state" by spreading
ideas and beliefs offensive to the rule of Islamic Shari'a and the religion of Islam, and had
distributed publications that "contained attacks against and aroused suspicions of the social
and religious order, especially the conventions of marriage, divorce, and the (permitted)
number of wives.").
78. See, e.g., Ehrman supra note, at 32.
79. Globalization, Gender, and Religion, supra note 2, at 19 ("Historically, both Islam
and Catholicism are similar in that they are monotheistic ... The god/king (king seen as
shadow of God on earth, zelollah) is challenged by the idea of a secular ruler accountable to
a higher order. A system of laws and rights emerges along with intellectual male elites
(popes, bishops, clergy, priests, ulama, muftis, ayatollahs, and mullahs) who are the
propagators and rulers of the new religious and moral order. The order is hierarchical,
communal, and authoritarian...").
80. Id. ("Both [Islam and Catholicism] have an element of egalitarianism in that they
recognize all humans, whether male or female, as equal before God."). See also Women's
Rights, Human Rights, supra note 5 at 173 ("We must acknowledge change, complexity,
and interpretive privilege in cultural formation to avoid reductionism, essentialism, and
rhetorical rigidity. This enables us to locate and condemn the particular historical
formulations of culture that oppress women (such as the emphasis placed by male religious
leadership on those passages in a religious text that permit wife beating) as well as to
understand and support women's ability to wrest freedom from amidst these oppressive
conditions (such as women's emphasis on other passages that advocate nonviolent and
respectful treatment of wives).").
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beginning to have a greater voice in interpreting religion," they are
still largely excluded from religious institutions and hierarchies with
authority over governmental (executive, legislative and judicial)
functionaries having the ability to interpret and apply religious laws.
Since religious leaders interpret and shape the religious legal
tenets that are applied when religious laws are implemented (by
religious courts or otherwise), this ban on women's participation in
lawmaking is an infringement upon women's right to participate
equally in governance, democracy, and decision-making, which are
essential components of lawmaking.82 Of course, religious law and
religious courts usually operate independently of the state, and
therefore the actions are not undertaken by government actors.8 3
Nevertheless, as noted above under the Social and Economic Rights
Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v.
Nigeria case, the African Human Rights Commission has affirmed
that the State is also obligated to ensure that private actors - arguably
including religious entities to which the government has delegated, or
permitted them to have, lawmaking or judicial authority - must
respect human rights (in like manner as government actors do).8 4
Moreover, a delegation of lawmaking authority by democratically
elected representatives to religious entities that discriminate against
81. Globalization, Gender, and Religion, supra note 2, at 42 ("It has taken western
women two centuries of fierce struggle (which continues today) to avail themselves of the
egalitarian themes of modernity. Initially, the egalitarian goals of modernity and its call for
'liberty, equality, and fraternity' were meant for men only.").
82. Id. at 49 ("An important challenge for Muslim feminists ... is that the Quran is seen
as the 'word of God' and consequently is immutable. In response, Muslim modernists and
feminists have noted that the symbolic wording of the Quran is not critical. Rather the
interpretation of the Quran by men forms the basis of Islamic law, application, and practice.
This male (ulama) monopoly of authority to interpret the Quran or engage in Ijtihad is what
Muslim feminists are challenging now. As Erika Friedl explains (Friedl 1997, 146)
'Theoretically these texts are beyond negotiation because they are claimed to emanate from
divine or divinely inspired authority. Practically, however, the Holy Writ has to be
translated, taught, and made understandable to the faithful ... This means it has to be
interpreted. Interpretation is a political process: the selection of texts from among a great
many that potentially give widely divergent messages, and their exegesis are unavoidably
influenced, if not outrightly motivated, by the political programs and interests of those who
control the formulation and dissemination of ideologies."').
83. An-Na'im supra note 10, at 176.
84. See AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, Social and Economic Rights Action
Center (SERAC) and the Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v. Nigeria, 155/96,
7 (Oct. 27, 2001), citing to VelAsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras and X and Y v. Netherlands.
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women, would not alleviate the violation. Democratically elected
governments frequently take actions that violate human rights of
marginalized segments of the population; simply because the
infringement is done by a democratic state does not make it any less
of a violation. One may argue that with the advent of universal
suffrage women can no longer be considered to be a marginalized
segment of the population. However, a relatively cursory glance at
the status of women relative to men using nearly any indicator
(economic, social, legal, political, health, nutrition, status within the
family, etc.) in nearly any country of the world will quickly correct
this impression. Under the above reasoning, the African Court or
Commission could legitimately question whether a government may
delegate legislative or judicial functions to religious entities. Either
entity could readily conclude that this would be a violation of
women's human right to participate in governance, democracy,
decision-making, and lawmaking.
B. Banning Women from Serving as Judges on Religious Courts
As explained above, both women and men have the right to a
trial by a fair, impartial, and independent tribunal. Prohibiting
women from serving as judges on religious tribunals is arguably a
violation of that right and may cause parties and others to question
their impartiality. With respect to the legitimacy of male-only
religious courts, one must ask: If all humans are equal before God,
why are only men allowed to define and interpret religion? Since no
religion is static, how does it change, and why can only men decide
what changes will be made? What are the politics of the religion, and
what are the politics underpinning the decisions of the (male)
religious lawmakers and adjudicators? Which among the many
possible competing religious precepts and interpretations should
apply? Who (males) select them and how? How are the alternative or
competing religious precepts and interpretations distinguished and
determined to be inapplicable or unacceptable? What are the nature
and dynamics of power relations among the holders of various views
or positions, and how are their interests affected by the issues in
question (e.g., the male religious leaders (in power) and the female
parties brought before the tribunals (not in power))? Who adjudicates
the process of selecting applicable standards and ensures the fairness
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and consistency of their application in practice?85 What is the status
of the lawmaker and adjudicator? For whose benefit is the argument
based upon religion advanced? To what extent have the social groups
primarily affected participated in the formation of the cultural
practices being protected?8 6 These questions are inherent in
examining the politics of religion, where religion is often used to
consolidate, confirm, and legitimize the privileged status of those in
power, i.e., males," to the detriment of women. In light of these
questions, perhaps the legitimacy, impartiality, and fairness of all-
male judges may reasonably be raised by the African human rights
system.
Additionally, a violation of the right to a fair, impartial, and
independent tribunal may also occur if the tribunal is required to take
its direction from religious leaders who are not sitting on that court, as
the court could not possibly be considered independent and could
probably not be said to be impartial. Independence of religious courts
may be compromised if the judges feel (or are in fact) compelled to
apply religious law as interpreted and dictated by other religious
leaders. This paper does not contest the influence of individually
held religious beliefs upon judges sitting on secular courts, since
every person maintains some perspective on religion (whether theist,
agnostic, or atheist) that influences her or his worldviews and actions.
However, secular judges should presumably take their direction in
interpreting the law from the law itself, not from religious authority
figures. For example, the mandate of the Catholic justices currently
serving on U.S. Supreme Court is to apply the Constitution, not
Catholic Canon Law handed down by the Pope and Bishops (who
incidentally are all male in accordance with traditional Catholic law),
just as the mandate of the Jewish justices is to apply the Constitution,
not Jewish law, and so on. See Justice Anthony Kennedy's decisions
concerning abortion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, and
concerning expanding Constitutional protections to cover sexual
orientation in Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas, which caused
85. An-Na'im, supra note 10, at 172-73 (similar questions were raised by An-Na'im in
the context of cultural legitimacy, but they are equally relevant in examining religious
tribunals and legislatures).
86. Women's Rights, Human Rights, supra note 5, at 6 (see the questions raised).
87. An-Na'im, supra note 10, at 173 (examines the "politics of culture").
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an uproar among conservative Catholics." The mandate of the justices
on the U.S. Supreme Court is to interpret and apply the U.S.
Constitution (which aspires to be neutral regarding religions), not to
apply a religious tenet nor the preferences of the Pope regarding a
particular case.
C Applying Discriminatory Religious Laws against Women
Many laws have historically had a negative impact upon women,
particularly in the area of family law.89 A women's rights advocate
has noted that "As in most countries, South African society is
patriarchal. Religious and traditional norms relegate women to an
inferior position in both society and family." 90 The traditional,
conservative interpretations of Catholicism, Islam, and other
religions regard women as inferior because women's traditionally
prescribed functions of motherhood, domesticity, and nurturing are
considered to render them "weak, unable to reason, inadequate to
engage in public or political activities." Issues intersecting religious
law and women's rights in Africa include honor killing, stoning,
veiling, seclusion, purdah which some call "gender apartheid,"92
male-privileged family laws, sex segregation, trokosi (religious
female bondage), inheritance, dowry, polygamy, guardianship,
prohibition on passing nationality to spouses and children, and
restrictions by male relatives on travel and work. Women's roles, as
framed within religious precepts, have been shaped significantly by
the historical, social and cultural context of the times, and have
changed dramatically across regions of the globe through recent
88. See 505 U.S. 833 (1992); 517 U.S. 620 (1996); 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
89. Women's Rights, Human Rights, supra note 8, at 137 ("However constructed
throughout the world, family laws and practices tend to perpetuate a patriarchal structure in
which women are subordinated to men and in which male economic and decision-making
powers are enhanced ... Men have been granted the right to make all important decisions for
women, unilaterally determining when they shall marry and divorce, when and how often
they shall bear children, and whether they shall be educated and permitted to work outside
the home. To varying degrees, all societies employ legal measures and social practices
designed to protect the superior position of men.").
90. Women's Rights, Human Rights, supra note 5, at 67.
91. Globalization, Gender, and Religion, supra note 2, at 18.
92. Women, Gender, and Human Rights, supra note 19, at 235.
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decades.93 Women who have stepped outside of stereotypically
proscribed roles have been socially stigmatized and at times violently
sanctioned in the name of religion.94
A few examples will help place the gender-based iscriminatory
religious laws into context. A former Leadership and Advocacy for
Women in Africa program fellow related that, "for the African
woman, the most severe violations of her human rights are 'rooted
deeply within the family system, bolstered by community norms of
male privilege and frequently justified by religious doctrines or
appeals to custom or tradition."'95 One example of discriminatory and
harmful intersections between religious law and violations of women's
rights is female religious bondage, a tradition in Ghana where girls
(not boys) are given to religious shrines as penitence for a crime
committed by another family member. The girls become sexual and
domestic servants of the priests (who are males) and are not permitted
to leave.9 6
Until overturned in 2007 by the highest Ugandan court, under
Ugandan civil law men were permitted to divorce their wives on
93. Id. at 235. ("It is important to note that the status of women in society-social,
political, legal, economic-has been fundamentally the same across history for a majority of
the world's population. Except for surface differences in manner and style, the basic
arrangements for division of labor and power between men and women have been the same
across the world. A woman's rights concerning major decisions about her children's future,
place of residence, marriage, inheritance, employment, and the like have been severely
curtailed in most of the world during most of human history. Until the beginning of the
twentieth century, when New Zealand became the first country to give women the right to
vote, there was no place on earth where women shared in the political process. Nor did they
have the same chance to train for a job, get a job, or, once having gotten it, receive equal
pay. Indeed, in some of these areas, especially in the area of ownership of land, Muslim
women fared better than women in the West. Significantly, the first fundamentalist
movement started in the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century. Protestant
fundamentalism came into existence very much in response to the modem age and
especially the new visibility and mobility of women. Everywhere, change in women's status
has meant a change in the culture of patriarchy. In other words, cultural change is both a
byproduct and requisite of change in women's status.").
94. Id. at 241 ("[t]here was a time when in the name of Christianity women were
burned at the stake as witches because their behavior did not conform to the prevailing
norms. Those who committed the murder justified their action by reference to Christian
principles.").
95. Adjetey supra note 20, at 1356, quoting Sonia Correa & Rosalind Petchesky,
Reproductive and Sexual Rights: A Feminist Perspective, in POPULATION POLICIES
RECONSIDERED: HEALTH, EMPOWERMENT, AND RIGHT, 107, 110 (Gita Sen, ed. 1994).
96. Id. at 1364.
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grounds of adultery, while women needed to establish that their
husbands had engaged in two or more marriage offenses (e.g.,
adultery and cruelty) in order to obtain a divorce.97 Furthermore, under
Islamic law, a man could easily divorce his wife unilaterally by
pronouncing talaq ("I divorce thee"), whereas a woman could only
divorce her husband by establishing specified grounds. Under
traditional Jewish law, a couple was not permitted to divorce legally
"unless the man signs a document of divorce (a get); not only is this
practice essentially unequal, but abandoned wives sometimes cannot
obtain the get and so are never free to remarry."98
Laws discriminating against Muslim women in Africa include
the following:
Laws commonly provide that the wife must obey her
husband, that wives are not allowed to work outside the
home without their husbands' permission, that men may
take up to four wives, that Muslim women may not
marry outside the faith, and that women are entitled to
only one-half the inheritance share that men inherit in the
same capacity. Depending on the country involved, one
may find that women are compelled to wear concealing
garments in public, that they are excluded from studying
certain subjects, that they [have been] deprived of the
right to vote, that they are barred from the legal
profession and the judiciary, that their testimony in court
is excluded or valued at one-half the weight of a man's,
that they are not allowed to travel without the permission
of a male relative, or unless accompanied by a male
relative, or that they are not allowed to drive cars.99
Due to the purported justification of domestic religious law,
certain countries have submitted reservations to CEDAW indicating
that women's rights will be interpreted in conformance with Shari'a
97. Women's Rights, Human Rights, supra note 5, at 159.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 177.
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law.'00 For example, Egypt has entered a reservation to Article 16
regarding equality between women and men in all matters relating to
marriage and family relations, indicating that those matters will
continue to be governed by Shari'a law. However, it is interesting to
note that governments are selective concerning which aspects of
religious law they will retain and apply (those restricting women's
rights) and those that the governments will decide to discard (e.g.,
those forbidding charging interest).101 As one scholar points out:
One may doubt whether these states actually believe in the
authoritative character of the official constructs of Islamic
culture that they put forward in international forums in
their efforts to justify their refusal to undertake reforms to
eliminate the legal barriers to women's equality. If the
governmental constructs of culture were indeed normative
and authentic, the elimination of legal barriers to equality
100. Id. at 181. ("One should also bear in mind that the versions of Islam invoked by
various UN delegations to justify reservations to CEDAW represent official constructs of
Middle Eastern/Islamic culture that are in almost all cases imposed by undemocratic
regimes, which raises doubts about whether they should be taken as representative of the
societies they dominate. Historically, Middle Eastern Muslim cultures have not been
monolithic creations imposed from above by the nation-state (the nation-state being a
modern innovation recently borrowed from the West). The actual cultures of the Middle
East have been produced by women as well as men and have shown innumerable variations.
Local expressions of Islamic culture have not necessarily corresponded to the norms
expounded by the Islamic jurists from the educated male elites of urban milieus, but have
been greatly influenced by forces such as folk tradition, mysticism, and customs that women
have participated in shaping. Is there, then, any reason to treat state-generated definitions of
.culture' and 'Islam' as authentic or definitive? And if the same states that have generated
these artificial national models of 'Islam' then subsequently insist that these very models
compel them to deny rights to women, why should outsiders accept such rationales,
particularly from states that have spotty records of adhering to Islamic law elsewhere?").
101. Id. at 28 n.23 ("In areas where women's rights are not involved, Egypt has
preserved its largely French-inspired legal system, refusing to reinstate Islamic law despite
strong pressures from fundamentalist groups for the Islamization of all laws."). See Rudolph
Peters, Divine Law or Man-Made Law: Egypt and the Application of the Shari'a, ARAB
LAW QUARTERLY 3 231-53 (1988) ("The Egyptian government does not seem to feel
compelled to follow Islamic law where this would require amputating the hand of the thief
or eliminating interest charges from the economy."). See also GLOBALIZATION, GENDER,
AND RELIGION, supra note 2, at 32-33 ("Like many current conservative Muslim leaders,
those in Opus Dei [an elitist, secret Catholic lay organization] seem to be interested in being
very selective in the aspects of modernity that they wish to import. They want the economic
development and economic prosperity that modernization brings, but would like to constrain
the social and political reforms (such as women's rights) that accompany modernization
today.").
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could be taken without risk of upsetting the status quo.
States could be confident that Muslim women would
react by saying that, despite the fact that it had become
legally permissible, they did not want to drive, vote, study
law, disobey their husbands' commands, demand an equal
share of inheritance, etc., because such things would be
deemed contrary to authoritative cultural norms. In reality,
it seems that governments appreciate all too well that the
cultural model they rely on to rationalize discrimination
against women has shaky authority and that Muslim
women increasingly aspire to equality - which is precisely
why Muslim men are obligated to have recourse to state-
sponsored legislation and rough police measures designed
to try to keep women in the place to which they were once
confined by the strictures of living custom and
tradition.'02
Some scholars hold it to be self-evident that discriminatory religious
laws must be changed to conform to international human rights
standards.103 This paper corroborates this assertion.
D. Imposing Religious Tenets upon Individuals Holding Different
Religious Beliefs
As established above, according to international human rights
standards, each individual is guaranteed the right to freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion and the right to nondiscrimination
based on religion. These rights arguably include the freedom to
adopt, exercise, change, and interpret one's own religious beliefs.104
By logical extension, no individual, group, or entity (whether
102. Women's Rights, Human Rights, supra note 5, at 182.
103. An-Na'im supra note 10, at 169 ("it is obvious that the responsibility to change
domestic laws [to comply with international human rights obligations] must apply to
religious and customary law.").
104. The fact that some interpretations of some religions may contravene these rights
(e.g., some Muslims assert that individuals cannot convert from Islam to another religion),
this does not nullify these precepts as human rights principles. By way of analogy, the fact
that the Catholic Church discriminates against women, such as its ban on women in leadership
positions, this does not nullify women's equality as a basic human rights principle.
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claiming to represent a government, a religion, or some other
authority) has the right to impose a religion (or a particular sect or
interpretation of religion) upon any other individual or group.1 0 5
Religious rights under international human rights standards are
permissive, not mandatory. In other words, individuals have the right
to choose whether or not to exercise religion, and if they choose to
exercise religion, they also have the right to choose how they will
exercise that religion (e.g., how they interpret the religion and apply
it within their own lives). This paper asserts that a religious court or
tribunal is inherently partial to applying its own interpretation of
religion (i.e., that of the judges sifting on the court), which could
possibly violate the religious rights of the person brought before the
religious court or tribunal if the person brought before the court
either holds a different religion entirely or holds a different
interpretation of the same religion.
Religious authority over legislative and judicial functions
applied to people who are not members of that religion is clearly
discriminatory (e.g., imposition of Catholic Canonical law upon
Muslims or Jews, imposition of Jewish law upon Muslims or
Christians, or imposition of Islamic law upon Jews or Christians).
This paper goes further, explaining that religious laws and religious
courts, as applied to a person who is a member of that same religious
group, may also effectuate religious discrimination - where the
person is of a different sect or maintains a different religious
interpretation of the religious tenets than that which is being imposed
upon her or him. Such religious discrimination is arguably a
violation of human rights law and should be recognized as such by
the African human rights system.
Many different sects, interpretations, and practices exist among
all major religions of the world.106 A question for the African human
105. As mentioned in a previous section of this paper, even if a majority of representatives
in a democratically elected government imposed a religion upon the population, this forced
religion would violate human rights (tyranny of the majority does not justify human rights
violations).
106. Globalization, Gender, and Religion, supra note 2, at 34 ("Not all members of the
Muslim scholars (ulama) chose a retrogressive reaction to modernity. Scholars such as
Egyptian Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) and the subsequent Salaflya movement in Egypt,
the Arab Middle East, and North Africa combined reformist Islamic principles with a
modernist responsiveness to the political and cultural pressures of Europe and modernity.
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rights system, then, is why should any group of people be able to
impose their own particular religious beliefs upon another individual
or group of people who hold different religious beliefs? This paper
argues that they should not, and that if they do, such action should be
considered a violation of internationally recognized human rights
principles and treated as such. Of course, as with many human rights
violations, this type of religious discrimination may well be
politically motivated, in order to retain power for the group that is
attempting to impose its own version of religion.107 As explained by
one theorist:
The more than a billion Muslims in the world live under
different laws and practice vastly different customs.
Even though they all identify themselves as Muslims,
they do not all understand or practice Islam in the same
way ... The modern Muslim society is a mix of values,
mores, and emotional responses. This is why any system
of government that wishes to force uniformity on this
dynamic variety will necessarily have to use considerable
violence. Because fundamentalist Islam's worldview is
defined mostly by its treatment of women, wherever
Islamism has assumed power or otherwise become
politically active women have born the brunt of this
violence . . . The Islamist position - insists that all rights
are derivatives of Islam as interpreted by a select group
of men. Most Muslim women object to this rendition of
Islam or their rights ... The central point in women's
human rights is simple. Muslim fundamentalists always
posit the question of women's rights within an Islamist
These scholars have tried to demonstrate the compatibility of science and religion,
democracy and faith, modernity and tradition. This response emphasized a return to the
Quran and the sayings of the Prophet, the right of independent interpretation and judgment
in religious matters (Qtihad), the abandonment of a stifling conformity to outmoded tradition
(Sunna), and opposition to cultic Sufi practices.").
107. Women's Rights, Human Rights, supra note 5, at 136 ("[S]tates sometimes directly
advance a religious legal code when doing so is deemed necessary and/or desirable,
repressing the internal contradictions and interpretive difficulties usually present in religious
law."). Also see id. at 144 n.7 ("For example ... differences in family legislation between
Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria - all Islamic countries - can be attributable to variations in
the balance of power between the state and local communities and the goals of the state.").
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frame of reference . .. [which] determines the boundaries
of the existence of every Muslim woman. The question I
as a Muslim woman ask is: Why should I not have the
right to determine how to organize my life? What gives
another person the right to interfere in my personal life?
Why is it that a Muslim cleric arrogates that right to
forcibly place me in a preordained framework? Does he
derive his authority from God? Does he derive it from
the text? Does he derive it from tradition? I reject all
these claims. I argue that as a Muslim woman I know in
principle as well as any man what God ordains or what
the text says. I argue that tradition is no longer a valid
source because societies change, cultures change, I
change, and I am both willing and able to discuss these
points with him. Before we begin this discussion, I grant
him every right to be who he wants to be; to do what he
wants to do; to preach what he wants to preach. I only
demand that he does not force me to do what he wants
me to do against my wishes, in the same way that I do
not force him to do what I wish.'0 s
As the above author demonstrates, any attempt to impose
another interpretation of Islam upon her would infringe upon her
right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.
108. Women, Gender, and Human Rights, supra note 19, at 239, 240 ("[R]eligious
experience is a personal experience, and ... all enforcement of religion is essentially not
religion but political acts of violence [oppression] perpetrated by one group of people
against another"). See also id. at 244 ("The argument and symbolism now advanced by
Islamist patriarchs under the guise of religion is very similar to the argument and symbolism
advanced nearly a century ago by the fundamentalists in the West. The English and
American suffragettes faced the same opposition, vilification, ridicule, and attacks on their
morality as contemporary Muslim feminists. The crass infringement of women's rights we
see in the Muslim world has more to do with power, patriarchy, and misuse of religion as
political weapon than with religion properly understood as individual faith. The Islamists draw
on the discourse of relativity, now in vogue in the West, to deny or infringe women's rights by
introducing or perpetuating a system of gender segregation. This we must oppose.").
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IV. The African Human Rights System Needs to Address
Violations of Women's Human Rights that
Result from Application of Religious Law
This section of the paper asserts that the African human rights
system, including civil society actors, should acknowledge and
address potential violations of women's human rights that are posed
by application of religious law and by the current functioning of
religious courts, and should hold states accountable for any
violations of international human rights law. 109 It offers suggestions
for possible mechanisms that might be used to help bring these issues
to light and move toward greater resolution, keeping in mind that
evolutionary as opposed to revolutionary change may lead to greater
acceptance. The actual change must come from within the community,
society, religion, and country itself in order to be internalized. And
vigilance is imperative to ensure respect for the rights of religious
minorities and to ensure their freedom of religion to the extent
possible, while at the same time protecting and promoting women's
human rights. Steps toward change may include:
* Civil society, such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
like Women in Law and Development in Africa (WILDAF) 10
and the International Federation of Women Lawyers
(FIDA),"' should document the negative, discriminatory
impacts of religious laws and courts upon women and draw the
attention of local and national governments and the African
Court and African Commission to them with calls for reform.
* NGOs and academics should research and publicize findings
on the origin and continuation of practices that discriminate
against women. It is likely that 1) those practices existed
109. An-Na'im, supra note 10, at 167 ("States are responsible for bringing their
domestic law and practice into conformity with their obligations under international law to
protect and promote human rights. This responsibility applies not only to laws enacted by
formal legislative organs of the state but also to those attributed to religious and customary
sources or sanction, regardless of the manner of their 'enactment' or articulation and/or
implementation. In other words, every state has the responsibility to remove any inconsistency
between international human rights law binding on it, on the one hand, and religious and
customary laws operating within the territory of that state, on the other.").
110. See, e.g., Women in Law and Development in Africa-Ghana, at https://www.faceb
ook.com/WomeninLawandDevelopmentGhana/.
111. International Federation of Women Lawyers, http://www.fidafederation.org/.
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within the communities before the introduction of that
religion, 2) the religious authority itself does not necessarily
mandate nor even condone the practice, and 3) the religious
text contains provisions that promote nondiscrimination
against women, tolerance of different religious interpretations
(a legitimate alternative view must be proposed and
accepted), 4) other religious practices have been changed or
abandoned when evidence arose that those practices were no
longer appropriate to the changes in society, 5) significant
benefits (e.g., economic, health, education, etc.) would inure
to society (including men!) by eliminating the discriminatory
practice. They could also consider how promoting respect for
individual religious rights and women's rights could enhance
the values embodied in that religion.
* Internal dialogues, including a greater pluralism of voices,
should take place within religious communities, such as those
fostered by Catholics for Choicell2 and Women Living Under
Muslim Laws.113
* Governments should allow for many diverse voices to be heard
addressing women's equality in conjunction with freedom of
religion, freedom of thought, freedom of speech, freedom of
assembly, and foster dialogue and conversation from within
religions and across religions.
* Women's rights advocates should work collaboratively with
fathers who want equality of opportunity for their daughters
(for example, see the Dads and Daughters campaign in
United States advocating for equality of opportunity in
education and sports)."4
* Human rights bodies should issue general comments or
general recommendations regarding religious law and
women's human rights, and a Special Rapporteur should be
appointed to investigate these issues.
* Education and training of civil society, judges, lawyers,
legislators, religious leaders, academics, law students, etc.,
112. Catholics for Choice, http://www.catholicsforchoice.org/.
113. Women Living under Muslim Laws, http://www.wluml.org/.
114. Sarah L. Rasmusson, A Great Dad Is Redefined A Fighter for Title IX, WOMEN'S
E-NEWS (June 22, 2000), http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfn/dyn/aid/152/context /ar
chive.
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should be provided, perhaps similar to the trainings by the
International Association of Women Judges.115
* Progressive religious leaders, judges on religious courts, and
other religious authority figures should be identified and
encouraged, and their reinterpretations of religious text
should be communicated widely.
* Women's rights advocates should engage the diaspora,
especially where it is dangerous to speak out within the
country, who could vocalize their support for women's rights
more freely, and could also mobilize resources to support
internal groups working on the issues.116
* More women should be appointed and elected to serve on
courts, legislatures, and other government entities.
* Women's rights proponents who advocate opening leadership
positions within religious institutions to women should be
supported (e.g., female Catholic priests, Imams, Anglican
priests, etc.). Women should be encouraged to serve as leaders
within religious entities.117
* Women's rights NGOs should file amicus briefs in
international and domestic tribunals, including religious
tribunals, regarding these issues.
* The African Court, African Commission, and NGOs
throughout Africa should seek law student volunteers from
around the world to foster cross-cultural dialogue, and to
enhance the capacity of these institutions with increased legal
personnel, and to develop a growing alumni network of
lawyers committed to the future success of these entities.
115. International Association of Women Judges, www.iawj.org.
116. Globalization, Gender, and Religion, supra note 2, at 36 ("By waging new debates
about the fundamentals of Islamic faith and practice, tackling and criticizing oppressive
traditions such as honor killing, domestic violence, spousal abuse, and male-biased family
law through satellite TV and the spreading world of the Internet, American and European
Muslim diaspora are slowly but steadily carving their modernizing and democratizing mark
on the Islamic world, particularly with regard to changes in gender roles, gender attitudes,
women's rights, and human rights ... The potent combination of modernity, democracy,
equal rights, and piety demonstrated by many among the Muslim diaspora presents the
Islamic world with a compelling alternative to extremism.").
117. See, e.g., Globalization, Gender, and Religion, supra note 2; Elizabeth A. Johnson,
SHE WHO Is: THE MYSTERY OF GOD IN FEMINIST THEOLOGICAL DISCOURSE (1992); Irshad
Manji, THE TROUBLE WITH ISLAM TODAY: A MUSLIM'S CALL FOR REFORM IN HER FAITH
(2003); RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS AND WOMEN'S LEADERSHIP: NEW ROLES INSIDE THE
MAINSTREAM (Catherine Wessinger, ed., 1996).
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* Moderate religious leaders should adopt interpretations of
religious texts that reinforce women's equality and
nondiscrimination.
* Women's rights advocates should work toward removal of the
reservations, understandings, and declarations to human
rights treaties that undermine women's rights.
* Governments and the African human rights system should
protect the rights of freedom of speech and association (as well
as the right to life, to protection from violence and other
harassment, etc.) of women who offer different interpretations
of religions, and who advocate for women's rights based on
religious and cultural changes within their own societies."8
* Regional conferences should be held throughout Africa on
women's human rights. At the Beijing Conference in 1995,
"[w]omen from southern Africa led the struggle to view
mistreatment of women in universal terms that make such
treatment unacceptable whatever the religious, cultural, and
traditional justifications."ll 9 Holding conferences throughout
different regions of Africa could help advance the dialogue
on all women's human rights, including those related to
religious laws and religious courts.
* States should ensure that civil laws are available as accessible
alternatives to religious laws:
Because many limitations on equality in the
family are based on religious or customary
personal status laws, successful implementation
of [CEDAW] requires countries to ensure that
individuals can marry under a civil marriage code
118. Women, Gender, and Human Rights, supra note 19, at 236 ("[N]either Islam nor
the culture of Muslim peoples is per se an obstacle to women's achieving rights. Rather,
Muslim women face patriarchal structures that certain men in power or seeking political
power misrepresent as religion and culture. The function of this misrepresentation is to keep
women where they best serve the patriarchal priorities. Where the civil society has already
somewhat developed ... the fundamentalist clerics seek to force women back to conditions
women have surpassed and therefore find unacceptable. The resulting tension between the
attempt at establishing various degrees of gender apartheid in Muslim societies and
women's determination to secure and preserve their human rights has led in recent years to
widespread and continuous violence ... [For example, i]n Algeria a veritable war of attrition
[has raged] where women are primary victims.").
119. Women, Gender, and Human Rights, supra note 19, at 200.
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designed on a basis of equality within the family.
All couples should be allowed to marry under the
civil code regardless of religion, race, or ethnicity.
This allows them to have the choice of marrying
without subjecting themselves to the inequities of
other codes and avoids the serious legal problems
that can arise when the spouses are from different
religious or ethnic communities and therefore
subject to different personal status laws.120
This suggestion would also avoid discrimination across religions,
discriminatory effect against kids, unanticipated future discrimination,
etc. Moreover, "Registration of marriage also provides a context for
the state to allow civil marriages and to control the application of
religious law. The state can decide, for example, that religious
marriages are valid only if they meet state-imposed requirements,"l21
such as minimum age requirements in order to prevent child
marriages.
VI. Conclusion
Governments that sanction religious law and religious courts
may be violating the fundamental human rights of women to
participation in governance, democracy, and decision-making; to an
impartial tribunal, to gender equality and nondiscrimination, and to
freedom of religion or belief. The paper concludes by acknowledging
that this issue may be very politically difficult to address,122 may take
120. Women's Rights, Human Rights, supra note 5, at 157.
121. Id. at 162.
122. Globalization, Gender, and Religion, supra note 2, at 43 ("In the Muslim world, the
factors of colonization and the anti-colonial secular or religious nationalism have
complicated the modem versus anti-modem alignments. In order to fight western/European
encroachment, many Muslim modernist liberals, including women's rights advocates and
feminists, have felt compelled to unite forces with retrogressive anti-modem religion-
nationalists (such as in Algeria, Iran, Palestine, and Lebanon). For instance, some scholars
have argued that because of more extensive and severe French domination in Algeria, the
patriarchy has been more persistent in this society than in neighboring Tunisia and Morocco
(Knauss 1987). Women in this situation are caught in a web of contradictions and are,
unfortunately, often compelled to postpone women's rights and feminism and give priority
to the battle over nationalist goals and ethno-religious identity politics. If some of them
choose to insist on the priority of their feminist agenda, they may reluctantly find
themselves in alliance with repressive yet secular and modernist military states (like in
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time to achieve as a practical matter, and may best be addressed
initially through education and dialogue among many actors,
including civil society.'23 It will undoubtedly entail a long, slow,
evolutionary process.124 Yet it is crucially important for the
established human rights entities - as well as other interested
partiesl2 - to confront the issue directly and productively to enable
forward momentum to gain traction. Hopefully this article will
contribute to that dialogue and help lead to greater gender equality
throughout Africa and the world.
Turkey and Algeria) in order to prevent a more sexist and religiously conservative
opposition from taking power. Women's movement and feminist strategizing around such
dilemmas has to be most delicately contextual.").
123. LAO Tzu, TAO TE CHING (c 604 bc c 531 bc) ("A journey of a thousand miles
begins with a single step").
124. See, e.g Women's Rights, Human Rights, supra note 5, at 159-60 ("The Tanzanian
Law of Marriage Act (1971) . . . provides for the distribution of property upon divorce with
regard to the contribution of each spouse, but the law was in effect for twelve years before
the Court of Appeal (which is the highest court) ruled that a wife's unpaid household labor
was to be considered a 'contribution' to the marital property for purposes of distribution.").
125. Women, Gender, and Human Rights, supra note 19, at 242. ("[Human rights are]
also related to obligation, morally and instrumentally. This is the most central point to the
concept of [human rights], namely, that to demand it for yourself you must defend it for
others.").
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